Battle of Borodino

Date and place

• September 7, 1812 (August 26 in Russia's Julian calendar) near the village of Borodino and the town of Mojaïsk, 125 kilometers west of Moscow (Russia).

Involved forces

• Grande Armée (125,000 to 130,000 men) under the command of Emperor Napoleon 1st.  
• Russian Army (110,000 to 130,000 men) under Tsar Alexander I and General-in-Chief Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov.  

Casualties and losses

• Grand Army: probably around 30,000 men out of action (although figures vary widely depending on the source), including 49 generals and over 100 colonels.  
• Russian Army: over 40,000 men killed or wounded.  

The Battle of Borodino was the biggest engagement of the Russian campaign, and one of the largest and deadliest of the Napoleonic period. Some 250,000 men fought, of whom 70,000 were put out of action. The French emerged victorious, but their success was not decisive.

The general situation

Napoleon I and his 600,000-strong Grande Armée entered Russia on June 25, 1812, to force Tsar Alexander I of Russia (Александр I Павлович Романов) to respect the terms of the Treaty of Tilsitt, signed in July 1807. Since then, the Russian government had gradually abandoned its commitments to the continental blockade, its consequences having been disastrous for the country's economy. Negotiations between the two partners in 1809 and 1810 failed to resolve this and other issues, such as the fate of Poland. Relations gradually deteriorated. Finally, in 1811, Napoleon decided to impose a military settlement. The Russians, for their part, had been preparing for this since the previous year.

At the beginning of September 1812, the French had been pursuing an enemy for more than two months who had constantly evaded the decisive battle the French Emperor had been hoping and praying for, either deliberately or out of timidity. Having entered Russia hoping to secure a major commitment as quickly as possible, Napoleon let himself be drawn in much further than expected. It was now all the more important for him to achieve a convincing success.

Many of the Russian military, with their rather offensive temperament, resented to constantly retreat in front of the French. This led to a serious crisis in the army's general staff, and cost his post to the head of operations, Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly (Михаи́л Богда́нович Баркла́й-де-То́лли) − too wait-and-see and too un-Russian in the eyes of many. To replace him, on August 18 the Tsar reluctantly called in General Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov (Михаил Илларионович Голенищев-Кутузов), whom he disliked.

Assuming supreme command, Golenishchev-Kutuzov in turn retreated to within 150 kilometers of Moscow − while regularly expressing his desire to face the enemy and fight. After that, he had no choice but to attempt to save the country's religious capital.

On September 3, the Russian army arrived near the village of Borodino [Бородино]. It first set up on the right bank of the Kalatsha River [река Колочъ], almost parallel to it. Its left flank touched Shevardino [Шевардино] to the west-southwest, then the front bent slightly to the east from the confluence with the Semionovskyi [Семеновский ручее] stream, and the right end of the position was at Maslovo [Маслово], to the east-northeast. This layout has since become known as the "first Russian position".

Shortly afterwards, the shortcomings of this layout led the Russian command to decide to move its left wing. During the day of September 5, it was to pivot around Borodino, bringing the Shevardino end south to Utitsa [Утицы]. This became known as the "second Russian position". It now put the Shevardino redoubt [Шевардинского редута] beyond the reach of Russian artillery, rendering it virtually useless.

September 5, 1812. The battle of Shevardino

In the early afternoon of September 5, 1812, the Russian rearguard, commanded by General Pyotr Petrovich Konovnitsyn (Пётр Петрович Коновницын) Pyotr Petrovich Konovnitsyn, burst onto the field, pursued by the French vanguard. At two o'clock, Prince Eugène de Beauharnais and his staff arrived in turn, shortly before the Emperor himself, who had come to examine the situation. A little later, on Eugène's orders, a first attempt was made to take Borodino. It went on long into the night, but to no avail.

While Eugène moved north, the rest of the Grande Armée settled on the site. General Louis-Pierre Montbrun Louis-Pierre Montbrun informed Joachim Murat that a major fortification had been observed between the villages of Doronino [Доронино] and Shevardino. Napoleon, immediately alerted, approached the site to study it. He discovered a pentagonal fortification: the Shevardino redoubt.

In his report, Kutuzov described it as an unimportant place, intended merely to delay the enemy's advance, without its loss having any disastrous consequences. Yet thousands of men would die defending it. The unexpected arrival of the French surprised the Russian army just as it was moving its left wing towards Semenovskaya. Unexpectedly, this move had to be made in contact with the enemy. There was a great risk that the latter would succeed in disrupting the operation and confusing the Russian army. As a result, this one had to stubbornly defend the redoubt until its left wing had taken up its new position.

Perhaps misled by faulty maps, Napoleon decided to seize the position before nightfall, believing that it covered the enemy left center and fearing that it would hinder the deployment of French troops. According to some (such as General Jean-Jacques Germain Pelet-Clozeau Jean-Jacques Germain Pelet-Clozeau), the Emperor, with a better knowledge of the terrain, would have settled for a flanking maneuver to force the Russians to withdraw.

However, once engaged, the battle quickly intensified.

Ahead of the rest of the 1st Corps, the 5rh Division of General Jean-Dominique Compans Jean-Dominique Compans was ordered to attack from the northwest, while Józef Antoni Poniatowski's Corps did the same from the wooded southwest. Followed by the cavalry units of Etienne-Marie-Antoine-Champion de Nansouty Etienne-Marie-Antoine-Champion de Nansouty and Louis-Pierre Montbrun, Compans crossed the Kalatsha at Fomkino [Фомкино] at around 3pm. The number of men committed to the offensive was around 35,000, equipped with 194 cannons.

On the Russian side, 8,000 infantrymen, 4,000 cavalrymen and 36 cannons defended the position, under the command of Prince Andrey Ivanovich Gorchakov (Андрей Иванович Горчавов) Andrey Ivanovich Gorchakov.

Despite the importance of the battle, both Kutuzov and Napoleon were content to oversee it from a distance. The former never left his headquarters, northeast of Shevardino, except for a brief trip along the Russian lines. For the rest of the time, he relied on the information transmitted to him by his officers. The latter spent most of the day in his tent near Valuyevo [Валуево], occasionally observing the progress of operations through his telescope. Napoleon was suffering from a severe cold and a high temperature.

Poniatowski's Corps was the first to go into action. The Polish advance, briefly halted by a dragoon charge, quickly resumed, but suffered from machine-gun fire from Russian artillerymen at the Shevardino redoubt and skirmishers. Russian fighters managed to contain the attack. The Poles deployed 24 guns, but their disadvantageous position exposed them to Russian counterfire.

Meanwhile, to the northeast, the 5th division prepared. Compans hid his infantry in the folds of the ground while setting up his batteries (from 8 to 12 guns according to sources) on ridges. They immediately set to work bombarding the Russians. The numerically superior French artillery was now deployed on both sides of the redoubt. The Russians and French pounded each other for two hours.

At the same time, Murat's cavalry crossed the Kalatsha to fill the gap between Compans and Poniatowski, while the divisions of Louis Friant Louis Friant and Charles Antoine Louis Alexis Morand Charles Antoine Louis Alexis Morand did the same north of Aleksinki [Алексинки]. The 3rd division, of Maurice Etienne Gérard Etienne Maurice Gérard and light cavalry of Alexandre Louis Robert Girardin d'Ermenonville Alexandre Louis Robert Girardin d'Ermenonville followed. With such support, Compans was able to devote his entire division to a frontal assault on the redoubt.

Around 5 p.m., the voltigeurs were the first to march, followed by the 57th and 61st line regiments, led by Compans. He moved to the right side of the entrenchment, while the 25th and 111th line regiments were sent north, the former to attack the village of Shevardino itself, the latter to threaten the Russians with a turning movement to their right.

The intensity of the combined Franco-Polish shelling and musketry eventually overwhelmed the redoubt's defenders. The artillery battery there began to withdraw on its own initiative, while the infantrymen supporting it began to turn back. This momentary respite allowed the French to approach the redoubt. The Russian command was slow to put an end to this hesitation. When they did, the Russians turned back and engaged in a deadly fusillade with the attackers. The two troops, separated by only a few dozen meters, blasted each other for almost three quarters of an hour. Compans then took command of two reserve battalions and personally led another assault. A battalion of the 57th line managed to enter the redoubt. Hand-to-hand combat was bloody.

By 7 p.m., the French were in control of the redoubt.

As night fell, Compans rallied his battalions, anticipating a counter-attack. In fact, Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration (Пётр Иванович Багратионv), commander of the 2nd Army of the West, which formed the Russian left flank, had sent reinforcements to Gorchakov. When these fresh units reached the battlefield, the fierce face-off resumed.

In the course of these new confrontations, the redoubt changed hands at least three times, according to some French memorialists, Gaspard Gourgaud in particular. The conditions made it difficult, even for the combatants, to get a clear idea of the course of operations. The darkness of the night led to surprises and mistakes.

This confused engagement finally came to an end around ten-thirty when Kutuzov learned that new French reinforcements had arrived on the battlefield and that the Poles were turning the Russian position to the left. Kutuzov recalled his troops and abandoned the fortress to the French. Russian sources all confirm that it was now in the hands of their compatriots. French memoirs claim the opposite.

The redoubt was definitively occupied by the French, who also held the villages of Aleksinki, Fomkino, Doronino and Shevardino. The Russians, exhausted, retreated to the Semionovskyi stream, which thus became their left flank.

Bagration, in a fiery account, asserted that despite the constant arrival of reinforcements, the enemy had been defeated everywhere by the courage of the Russians. Kutuzov, for his part, wrote to his wife, Ekaterina Ilyinichna Golenishcheva-Kutuzova (Екатерина Ильинична Голенищева-Кутузова), that he had had a hellish battle on the left flank that day.

Not much remained of the redoubt, and there was nothing left alive in its ruins. The surrounding area was strewn with the corpses of men and horses. Further on, the villages of Doronino and Shevardino were also devastated. Soldiers fell asleep in the bushes, despite the wind, the freezing rain and the presence of the enemy within pistol range.

Dominique-Jean Larrey's ambulances spent the night collecting the wounded (primarily allies, but some Russians too) and bringing them back to the infirmaries, where the surgeon's subordinates worked tirelessly. In the morning, the fruit of their labor was piled up in the ditches beside the road in the form of amputated limbs and lifeless bodies.

The battle of Shevardino proved costly for both sides. Russian losses are estimated at around 5,000 men and several cannons. French losses were somewhat lower, ranging from 4 to 5,000 soldiers. Some regiments suffered particularly badly, such as the 61st Line, one of whose battalions was wiped out. What surprised and worried the Emperor was the paltry number of enemy prisoners. To General Armand de Caulaincourt, who informed him of this, he asked a significant question: are these Russians determined to win or die?

September 6th

The terrain

Once definitively fixed, on the morning of September 6, the Russian position stretched eight kilometers from north to south.

1. Its right flank touched the Moskva [Москва-река] (the river, a sub-tributary of the Volga, from which Moscow takes its name) and rested on one of its tributaries, the Kalatsha. The latter was almost impassable from Borodino to Moskva; elsewhere, its right bank, often higher than the other, offered the Russians, who occupy it, definite protection.
2. The center surrounds the Kurgannaia hill, in front of which flows the Semionovskyi stream.
3. The left wing extended up to a thick forest, almost impenetrable in its natural state, but made even more impenetrable by Russian arrangements.

This position was an unprecedented seven kilometers deep. The bushes lining the rear of the fortifications provided valuable stealth for troop deployments and reserve Corps movements.

Major fortification work had reinforced the position's natural defensive assets. On the right wing, not far from the village of Gorki [Горки], two projecting batteries had been installed, housing three and nine artillery pieces respectively. In the center of the position, on a rise above the Kurgannaia heights, a bastion with front and side ramparts was built. Eighteen cannon had been placed here, and the whole thing had been dubbed "redoute Raïevski" [батареи Раевского pour les Russes] by the French [батареи Раевского for the Russians]. The village of Borodino, on the west bank of the Kalatsha, was also fortified. On the Russian left wing, between the Kurgannaia and the forest, a little to the south of the village of Semenovskaya, three redents (works consisting of two faces which form a salient angle towards the countryside), known as "Bagration flèches" [Багратионовы флеши], were built. The village itself was completely razed to the ground to give the artillery free rein. This side, however, represented the weak point of the system, as both Russian and French commanders were well aware.

All in all, the position, which blocked the two roads from Smolensk to Moscow, the old one [Старая смоленская дорога] as the new one [Новая смоленская дорога], was the best Kutuzov could find in the area, even if military writers are not allways very happy with it.

Establishment of armies

The Russian army faced west. Behind swarms of foot hunters, it was arranged in three lines, providing considerable stability and facilitating the movement of troops and equipment. The left wing (to the south, between the Great Redoubt and Utitsa) was under the command of Prince Bagration. He supervised the Corps of Nikolay Nikolayevich Rayevsky (Николай Николаевич Раевский) Nicolay Nikolayevich Rayevsky, Mikhail Mikhailovich Borozdin (Михаил Михайлович Бороздин) and Nikolay Alexeyevich Tuchkov (Никола́й Алексе́евич Тучко́в) Nikolay Alexeyevich Tuchkov, the latter of whom had rushed in during the night to complete the position between Bagration's arrows and the village of Utitsa. The right (to the north, between the Great Redoubt and Moskva), made up of the Corps of Dmitry Sergeyevich Dokhturov (Дмитрий Сергеевич Дохтуров) Dmitry Sergeyevich Dokhturov, Alexander Ivanovich Ostermann-Tolstoy (Александр Иванович Остерман-Толсто́й) Alexander Ivanovich Ostermann-Tolstoy, Karl Fyodorovich Baggovut (Карл Фёдорович Багговут) Karl Fyodorovich Baggovut and the cavalry Corps of Pavel Petrovich Pahlen(Па́вел Петро́вич Па́лен) Pavel Petrovich Pahlen, obeyed Barclay de Tolly.

Kutuzov stood on a hill a little behind the village of Gorki. Grand Duke Constantine (Великий князь Константи́н Па́влович) Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich commanded the reserve. The cavalry was divided between the units of Karl Karlovich Sievers (Карл Карлович Сиверс) Karl Karlovich Sievers, Pahlen, Fyodor Karlovich Korf (Фёдор Ка́рлович Корф) Fedor Karlovich Korf and the Cossacks of Matvei Ivanovich Platov (Матвей Иванович Платов) Matvei Ivanovich Platov and Fedor Petrovich Uvarov (Фёдор Петрович Уваров) Fedor Petrovich Uvarov. The Russians' total strength reached around 135,000 men, with 640 cannon (334 for the first line, 104 for the second and 186 for the third).

The Grande Armée remained in Shevardino after taking it. From north to south, the Corps of Prince Eugène, Michel Ney, Louis-Nicolas Davout and Joseph Poniatowski formed the front. Slightly behind Davout, the cavalry was divided between Montbrun, Marie-Victor-Nicolas de Faÿ de Latour-Maubourg Marie-Victor-Nicolas de Faÿ de Latour-Maubourg and Nansouty. The Imperial Guard was in reserve, as were the Corps of Jean Andoche Junot and Murat. Napoleon had a total of 130,000 soldiers and 587 cannons at his disposal. In view of Kutuzov's system, Napoleon decided that turning the Russian army from the flanks, as Davout had proposed, was not only impossible, but far too risky. What's more, the movement would have to take place at night, when the Russians themselves, under similar conditions, had gotten lost fleeing Smolensk.

So, contrary to usual, he opted for a frontal assault. His intention was to drive the enemy into the Moskva before destroying them. He therefore concentrated the bulk of his army on an axis pointing towards the Bagration spires and the great Rayevsky redoubt. He himself positioned a little to the south of the Shevardino redoubt.

On the 6th, Kutuzov toured the Russian camp accompanied by popes and relics. In the evening, the Mikhail Semionovich Vorontsov (Михаил Семёнович Воронцов) Mikhail Semionovich Vorontsov division moved into the spires. Napoleon, for his part, inspected the terrain, then had his soldiers Napoléon, à la veille de la bataille de la Moskova, présente à son état-major le portrait du roi de Rome peint par Gérard, by H. Vernet look at the portrait of his son Le Roi de Rome, by F. Gérard that he had received that very day. It was also on this day that he heared the news of Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de Marmont's defeat at Salamanca, brought all the way from Spain by Captain Charles Nicolas Fabvier Charles Nicolas Fabvier, aide-de-camp to the Duke of Ragusa.

September 7th. The Battle of Borodino

At dawn on September 7th, Napoleon's proclamation was read in the bivouacs: Soldiers, this is the battle you have so longed for! From now on, victory depends on you. [...] Let it be said of you: "He was at this great battle under the walls of Moscow. On September 7 (August 26 according to the Julian calendar then used by the Russians), between 5 and 6 a.m., the battle began with operations on the French center and extreme left. On this side, Prince Eugene carried out an attack on the village of Borodino, designed to divert enemy attention from the heart of the battlefield. The Russian fighters were pushed back and crossed a bridge on the right bank of the Kalatsha, which they did not have time to destroy behind them.

The 106th line regiment, instead of simply occupying the village as ordered, crossed in pursuit, coming up against Dokturov's entire army Corps, and was soon annihilated. The division of Alexis Joseph Delzons Alexis Joseph Delzons failed to hold on to its conquest in the face of the Russian counter-attack. However, Dokturov's troops eventually withdrew, this time destroying the bridge behind them. Eugène now had to wait for the capture of the arrows before attacking the Rayevsky redoubt from the north with the Morand and Gérard divisions, who had also crossed the Kalatsha one kilometer west of Borodino. The Jean-Baptiste Broussier division remained in reserve on the left bank.

In the center, an intense artillery duel was initiated by the French. But their guns proved to be too far from the enemy lines. They had to be moved closer, which took time, as around 100 guns had to be translocated. The Compans and Joseph Marie Dessaix Joseph Marie Dessaix divisions of Davout's Corps were ordered to seize the southernmost spire. Compans attacked in column, while Dessaix, in reserve, ensured the security of his rear and right. Russian artillery targeted them, and both generals were wounded, though this did not halt the progress of their troops. Davout set off to lead them, but his horse was killed just as the right arrow was taken. The marshal fell so heavily that his death was announced. Napoleon sent Ney as reinforcement, Murat to replace Davout and general Jean Rapp to replace Compans. They found the Prince of Eckmühl alive and well, but Rapp was wounded.

After an hour's fighting, Napoleon sent Ney's infantry and Murat's cavalry to support Davout, allocating some 40 additional cannons, and by 7.30 a.m. the arrows were in the hands of the Grande Armée. A Russian counter-attack led by Bagration with reinforcements from Kutuzov soon dislodged them. Ney recaptured them for the first time at ten o'clock, then again at eleven and finally definitively at eleven-thirty. Until then, after each success, he had had to give ground to Baggovut, whom Barclay had positioned, with considerable forces and 24 cannons, at the village of Semenovskaya, just north of the spires. While Ney, Davout and Murat led a frontal assault, Junot's Corps made its way through the Utitsa forest to the rear of the forts. A battery of Russian horse cavalry spotted the movement just as Junot was about to attack and opened fire on the French, who were then driven back into the woods by Baggovut's infantry. In the decisive assault, Napoleon launched almost 45,000 men and 400 cannons to conquer the arrows. The Russians had only 20,000 to counter, but held out bravely, until General Bagration's wound sapped their morale. General Konovnitsyn temporarily took his place, and the Russians moved their defensive line back behind the Semionovskyi stream, where they were protected by the fire of 300 of their cannons. Dokturov was sent to replace Konovnitsyn. The fighting continued for several hours at this point, without the Russians ever giving ground.

At the end of the French right flank, General Poniatowski moved in front of Utitsa at around 8 a.m., then pushed Tuchkov back to the height of Utitsa. For the next three hours, his efforts to dislodge him failed, until Junot's support finally enabled him to take it by storm. The Poles of the Grande Armée were now in a position to turn the Russians to their left. Aware of this danger, Tuchkov organized a victorious counter-attack in which he was mortally wounded. Baggovut succeeded him and managed to hold his position until the Russian center itself retreated behind the Semionovskyi stream.

But the Grande Armée's main effort was now focused on the Rayevsky redoubt.

To the north, Eugène de Beauharnais, after taking the village of Borodino, turned south-southeast towards the great redoubt. However his troops, faced with Russian counter-attacks, became disorganized and began to retreat. He left General Delzons to protect the village of Borodino, and crossed the Kalatsha to attack the fortification from the north. His artillery soon began to drive the Russians back. Meanwhile, the Morand (from the south) and Broussier (from the west) divisions also attacked the fortification. Eventually, the French took control. Kutuzov, determined to retake it, brought forward a brigade and two regiments of the Russian Guard, supported by three batteries. Their counter-attack was victorious, despite the intervention of the Gérard division in support of Morand. The Russian troops regained possession of the fortress.

The French artillery took the lead in the battle. It intensively bombarded both the great redoubt, from Eugène's positions, and the Semenovskaya heights from those of Ney and Davout. The effects on the enemy ranks were considerable. The commander of the Russian artillery, General Alexander Ivanovich Kutaisov (Алекса́ндр Ива́нович Кута́йсов) Alexander Ivanovich Kutaisov, was killed, disrupting the conduct of operations. Some of the guns left in reserve remained unused.

Hand-to-hand fighting continued for several hours, with frightening intensity, but without any convincing results.

Kutuzov tried to send two cavalry Corps to surprise the allied rear by overrunning their left flank. The maneuver failed, but slowed French operations and gave Kutuzov time to reinforce his center and his own left.

At around 2 p.m., the French army once again attacked the redoubt. This time, the Broussier, Morand and Gérard divisions led the attack, supported by the light cavalry of Louis-Pierre-Aimé Chastel Louis-Pierre-Aimé Chastel to the south and the second reserve cavalry Corps to the north. General Auguste Jean Gabriel de Caulaincourt Auguste Jean Gabriel de Caulaincourt, who had just been given command after Montbrun's death in an earlier charge, put himself at the head of the Pierre Wathier division and succeeded in taking the redoubt. He was killed shortly afterwards. His success led to the withdrawal of the Russian cavalry at a time when Kutuzov's left and center were showing signs of weakness. Murat, Davout and Ney decided to call in the Imperial Guard to deal the final blow to the Russian army. Napoleon refused, anxious to keep his reserve intact when he had advanced so far into enemy territory.

It was now around 4pm. The Russians retreated several hundred meters, but maintained their cohesion. By 6 p.m., they had regrouped on a new position, a ridge line further east.

By nightfall, Napoleon brought the army back to its original bases, while guarding the battlefield. He was convinced that the fighting would resume the following day, as the day's results had not been decisive for either side. However, at midnight, Kutuzov, believing his army to be too depleted to continue fighting, ordered a retreat. The retreat began before dawn on the morning of the 8th, in the direction of Moscow.

Results

Losses were enormous on both sides. At least 30,000 Frenchmen were put out of action, including 6,500 killed, among them 49 generals. The Russians counted 44,000 dead or wounded. Foremost among the twenty-four generals killed in the battle were Bagration, who died on September 24, and General Tuchkov. Many of the survivors perished in the following days, particularly in the Grande Armée, due to lack of care or supplies.

Consequences

The battle so desired by Napoleon since the beginning of the campaign was not decisive. The Russian army was not destroyed and needed only a short time to make up for its losses. On the other hand, victory had cost the French too much for their situation to improve significantly. So, a week later, on September 14, 1812, when they entered Moscow, the Tsar did not see this as sufficient reason to ask for peace. The outcome of this bloody confrontation was therefore particularly disappointing for Napoleon. His strategy, based on the search for the decisive shock that would totally destroy the enemy's ability to resist, failed.

Napoleon chose to name this engagement after the river that meanders a few kilometers northeast of the battlefield. For him, this had the advantage of evoking the name of the former capital of the Tsars, and suggesting that the battle took place beneath its walls. The Russians, on the other hand, prefer to use the name of the village of Borodino, around which the fighting took place.

As was their custom at the time, the Russians claimed victory. However, they abandoned the field, suffered more dead and wounded than the French troops, and allowed their enemy to enter Moscow a few days later. From this point of view, it's impossible to concede them the victory. In strategic terms, however, the French's failure to destroy the Russian army and thus achieve the decisive success they had been chasing since their entry into the war meant that their victory was nothing more than Pyrrhic.

Prince Kutuzov's headquarters were located in the village of Gorki.

A monument erected a few hundred meters from the Shevardino redoubt marks the spot where Napoleon stood during the fighting.

Napoleon wrote in his memoirs that the Moskva battle (has he named it. For us, the battle of Borodino) had been the most terrifying of all his battles. The French had shown themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians had arrogated to themselves the right to be invincible.

Ordre de bataille